Toward a New Elitism

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Introduction

The rise of popular culture programs in universities is to a significant degree a consequence of the rejection of a particular theory of aesthetics. According to this older, rejected view, the classical, "fine" arts were considered—largely on the basis of complexity of form—higher, more refined, more admirable, and of greater value than other kinds of "popular" creative activities. While the former were the subject of intense critical study, the latter were neglected, seen as unworthy of serious attention. Ultimately, the sociological fact that these classical forms of culture were intimately connected to a certain privileged socioeconomic strata—society's "elite"—triggered a reassessment of not only the canon but also the very notion of canonical, exalted works.

The backlash to this traditional view of an art hierarchy is so pervasive that today "elitism" has been replaced by an egalitarianism typified by the leveling of appraisals with regard to cultural practices and products.

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This has resulted in the "elevating" of those genres that were formerly dismissed or ignored so that the world of art criticism, in academia at least, is essentially a flatland in which all that can be said of a work's formal qualities is that the particular work manifests the typical traits of its genre well or poorly. Or, what is more commonly found in popular culture programs, artworks are treated as tokens of cultural identity. In this way it has become customary to speak of the artwork as a voice for this or that subculture, or to weigh a genre's importance according to how significantly it has impacted society as a whole. In such light the singer Madonna is treated as a symbol for feminist empowerment, gangsta hip-hop is the emergence of a new poetic of the street, graffiti tagging is an art of identity, and so on. But in the process what has happened to the aesthetic? Is there not a place for the assessment of an *experience* of art?

With this condition in mind, we hope to restore respect for the notion of elitism. We acknowledge the divisiveness that the word "elite" invites, but we also question the abandonment of a vertical element in the aesthetic dimension. But in doing this we will co-opt the word "elite," moving it from a tag for a social class or particular genres of art; instead we will use "elite" to describe a special kind of experience. As we will argue, elite experience of artworks is not equivalent to but is a qualified type of aesthetic experience. If there is an elitist, in our view, it is someone who seeks, through works of art, a particular kind of experience. Our proposal argues that some works of art may be reasonably described as elite because of their power to elicit within us this kind of experience. Artworks that have this power deserve to be exalted. By taking the spotlight off an artwork's sociological significance and returning it to a work's experiential significance, an aesthetic theory is constructed that is compatible in many cases with the older formalist view while permitting an even critical landscape between genres and social classes. Our theory offers qualified admittance to Mozart and Madonna, but it is the experience that grants the qualification and the admittance.

Procedure

In order to accomplish our task, we must explain our use of key terms that are crucial to the discussion. First, we must lay out the way we intend to use the term "work of art." We shall then examine the kind of rare and desirable experience we see some works of art to be capable of engendering. As we place the focus of the elite on what happens in the apperception of art, not on what species of form the work of art happens to possess, we will not address the question of whether particular qualities in artworks, or genres of works, may or may not be more capable than others in enabling an elite experience. But in laying aside that question, it will be necessary to pick up others. In that regard, it will be especially necessary for us to describe the

kind of experience we call elite and to distinguish our view from kindred aesthetic theories.

Although, as we have indicated, the word "elite" is charged with connotations we are taking pains to deny in this essay, we nevertheless believe that it is the appropriate term to use for the experience we want to focus on. As an experience that some works of art engender for some recipients, such experiences are rare, valued both in themselves and as a social virtue to be sought and reinforced, and furthermore, we believe, they are considered valuable in all cultures; consequently, these experiences are indeed elite.

Terminology

The account that we will be presenting develops from a semiotic foundation that understands all experiences to be particular kinds of effects of signs relating to their referents. But what is a sign? Paraphrasing C. S. Peirce's answer to this question, a sign is something that stands for something else, its referent, to an apprehension, called the *interpretant*.[1] In calling the interpretant "an apprehension," we intend it in the broadest possible sense to include not only intellectual responses but all effects on a receiving mind, including expressive, emotional, and connotative features. A sign's interpretant, considered as a holistic apprehension, including its emotional and intellectual or cognitive components, is the entire experience of the sign.

The word "art" as a term that refers to all "artworks" is notoriously difficult to pin down, and any attempt to define it will be met with objections or qualifications from different quarters. In this discussion we shall use the word "art" in a general way to refer to the broad class that contains examples of works of art. We take the phrase "work of art" and the term "artwork" to be synonymous. It will be important to keep in mind the descriptive, nonevaluative sense in which we will be employing these terms. Many people use the term "work of art" normatively as an evaluation, as in, "That painting is terrible, but this other is a real work of art." We mean "work of art" to refer to a certain kind of event or object (more precisely, a certain kind of sign) without making any appraisal of its merits. In other words, chairs, pens, and artworks carry the appellations "chair," "pen," and "artwork" independently of anyone's evaluation of them as being good pens, good chairs, or good artworks.

What Is a Work?

Our procedure will be to offer our conception of what it is to be a work of art, followed by a statement about distinct kinds of experiences that works

of art produce. To build toward a conception of a work of art, let us begin with the more general conception of "a work." A work is any thing or any event that, as one aspect of its interpretant, includes the inference that it is the result of purposeful action toward its production. More colloquially, anything we assume or infer to have been intentionally made is a work.

While this definition may not exclude many of the things made by people, it does exclude accidents. Upon his arrival on a remote tropical island, Robinson Crusoe does not interpret Friday's footprint on the beach as a deliberately made greeting, nor as the carefully pressed print having some unknown significance, but rather as a mark left by happenstance. It does not seem to be shaped in a specific way, with some focused, deliberate intent. It seems to be an unwitting by-product of the process of someone walking across the beach. Although Friday's footprint, to Crusoe, is an important indexical sign yielding information, it is not a work. Accordingly, natural phenomena are not to be considered, in our present context, works. One might claim that clouds are the work of zephyrs and condensation, or sunlight, or as the work of physical processes of the sun, but we consider these to be figures of speech. The manner in which we use the word here is neither arcane nor especially technical; we use it as a noun in the way it is generally employed. A field of corn is the work of the farmer, a book the work of the author, a dress the work of the dressmaker.

As seemingly straightforward as the concept appears to be, we nevertheless feel the need to suggest some minimal threshold for the notion of a purposeful action as suggested by the adverb "intentionally." Granted that many things (an earthen mound, for example) might be provisionally held to be the product of purposeful action (e.g., as a burying place) rather than the result of accidental or natural processes, we are not required to assert that there be consensus of the determination of an object as a work. We are satisfied to allow ambiguity of interpretation and especially the disagreements that may spring up between various interpreters. Nevertheless, we would suggest this qualifying condition to the notion of what is purposeful: irrespective of how much or little one might manipulate materials, the purposeful action must, at the very least, include willful attention and guidance (even the passive guidance of allowing something to happen by guarding against countervailing forces) by an agent. One might imagine creating a set of circumstances such that the exact material outcome of the process is not foreseeable. This is what John Cage did in his composition *4:33*. And it is, to some extent, what potters do when they surrender final results of glazing and coloring to the kiln. However, the framing of the circumstances is a willful attention toward the production, even if no direct manipulation intervenes after the start. We trust that anything commonly called "a work" will be seen to adhere to this formulation and that things

one finds difficult to construe as works will indeed depart in significant ways from it.

What Is an Artwork?

A work of art is a kind, or species, of the larger class, or genus, of works. That it is a particular kind of work entails that the work of art will in every case include those identifying features of works but will also include further unique circumstances or conditions that are proper to it and to no other subclass of works.

So, while an artwork is something interpreted as having been guided or shaped into its being, the result of an agent's intention or purposeful action, a second inference is necessary to determine the work to be an artwork. Things called art summon us, ask for our engagement in a particular way; in their presentation to us they ask us to spend time with them, to study them, to live with them, in them: they, in a sense, offer themselves to be beheld. Thus, we may say that a work of art is a work that is offered for active contemplation.[2] We will need to explain what we mean by the terms "offered" and "contemplation."

The sense of contemplation appropriate here concerns concentration, focused attention on qualities within the artwork as these components interact and mutually affect one another.[3] The critical point about contemplation is that artworks are not to be understood as "signs to action"—that is, signs that are transparent in and of themselves and function strictly as means to affect behavior on the part of the interpreter. Rather, to appreciate a piece of music or a painting, one might pause to contemplate it. Or, in the case of some music, contemplation could take the extremely active form of dancing to it. The key is that contemplation is a kind of concentrated beholding, characterized by the riveting of attention upon the work intransitively—that is to say, for its own sake. Rather than signaling something other than the work itself that calls for action, the response is reflexive, calling one's attention back to the sign. The feedback created by this reflexivity does not easily permit attention to be shunted outside the immediacy of the sign. This process stands in contrast to other, nonaesthetic experiences where the sign is used to spin our attention outward to other things, not to fix our attention on itself. This reflexivity is an attraction force, not a *dis*traction or an *ab*straction or an *ex*traction. In an etymologically pure sense, by attraction one is "gripped" by the work, in the thrall of it, held fast by it. The reflexive self-referencing onto the sign pulls us to attend to increasingly finer details of it and to notice how the sign makes connections to its referents.[4]

There is, in this act of contemplating, a sense of fusing with the work, being in it, of what Eliseo Vivas called "rapt attention" (we will have more to say on Vivas). Meanwhile, the concomitant associations and emotions

that are thereby engendered spring forth, braided into a complex interaction of nuances. At least, such is the potential of the act of contemplation. This focused attraction has been identified by many as the crucial hallmark of the aesthetic experience—though, as we shall now add, in a work of art it is inevitably accompanied by a second condition.[5]

This second condition is that the work be interpreted as being "offered." The work is seen as being presented, given, exhibited, performed, for some interpreter. This presenting or offering implies two agents, one giving and one receiving. The original giving agent is usually called the artist; the receiving agent, which may include (or sometimes even consist solely of) the artist, is generally called the audience. The important and defining aspect here is to be found neither with the giver nor with the receiver but with the interactive stance that prevails between them. The offering consists of an implied social exchange in which the work is not necessarily contemplated (de facto) but is seen as being in some sense "pedestaled," given forward, extended, for contemplation.

This makes a work of art the product of a particular kind of semiotic act, one in which an inference that a sign is a purposeful product is combined with a further inference that the sign is being offered to be contemplated in its own qualities rather than to be solely a means to some utilitarian end. Artworks are the only kinds of sign complexes that function in this way.[6]

Three additional points must be made to ensure that our position is rendered as clearly as possible. The first is that, beyond the walls of the artist's studio, it is irrelevant to the status of the work (vis-à-vis artwork) whether its maker set out to produce a work of art; it is the interpreter's inference that counts. The attainment of the status of the work as an artwork may therefore happen well after its production and may even be an interpretation with which the maker disagrees. If the interpreter assesses the sign as having been a purposefully made thing, and also infers that it is offered for contemplation, then it will attain the status of artwork regardless of the maker's intentions. But should either of these prerequisites be excluded from the interpretant, then the sign will be regarded as something other than a work of art.

The second point of clarity is that we wish to reiterate that the status as a work of art is in no way an evaluative or normative one in the sense that a work of art is something that is necessarily meritorious. While it is undoubtedly the case that the one who offers it usually hopes, desires, or expects that the work will be appreciated, perhaps even esteemed, and that at minimum the artist presumably finds it admirable, the status of the object as a work of art does not require that it be admired or be admirable per se. Our definition requires only the inference that it is mustered forward, so to speak, proffered as a candidate for contemplation—a much lower criterion.

The third point of clarification is to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between anything that may elicit an aesthetic experience and

the work of art. Were it sufficient to settle the question of the status of a work of art merely on aesthetic grounds—that a thing or event is an artwork if it simply succeeds in eliciting a contemplative experience—then all aesthetic experiences, from sunsets to lovers, pieces of driftwood, or volcanic eruptions, would be art. But in our view, to call sunsets or lovers works of art is to employ figures of speech. To be truly a work of art, as should be clear by now, it is further required that the thing in question first be a work—that is, the result of purposeful action. It should finally be added, as noted above, that conflating the aesthetic with the status of artwork does not allow for the work of art that may indeed fail to excite an aesthetic response.

As a shorthand summary of our definition of a work of art, we offer the following schematic:

an artwork is
a work
    (an event or thing that is a product of purposeful action)
offered for
    (inferred as being presented for)
active contemplation
    (reflexive and intransitive attention)

Functionality and the Art Situation

The ideas of work and artwork offered here imply a situational and functionalist approach to art. Its situational aspect permits the status of a work of art to shift, while its functionalist aspects account for variability in the effects works of art have on audiences. We would like to expand on both of these traits.

As one of us has said, "An art situation occurs when things called 'works of art' . . . are present in some context."[7] Within the context of this contact between the work of art and the receiver, there are three components: an implicit and inferentially determined agent or maker who was the producer of the work (usually called the artist), the work of art, and the receiver (usually called the audience).[8] The experiencing of the work of art is a function not only of what reaches the eyes of the receiver from the canvas in the moment of perception but also of the environmental and cultural context within which the art situation occurs. The diagram below shows the interactions present in an art situation.[9]

This larger context constitutes the background for the interpretant, influencing the interpreter's response. As situationally and inferentially determined, a work of art is not different from other manifestations of experience. However, unlike nonart experience, a work of art is phenomenalogically objective—that is, it "attracts attention just as other things abstract attention."[10] However, a thing "becomes aesthetic" when its features



Figure 1. The Art Situation.

"are regarded for their own sakes, that is, without concern for their relations to things and qualities that are independent of the object of attention."[11]

"Status drift" in a work of art

The nonevaluative, descriptive status—whether something is considered to be, or not to be, an artwork—is especially prone to drifting, depending upon the situation in which it is encountered. The art situation requires inferences on the part of a receiver toward the object that is perceived, the assumed agent of its making, and a social-cultural context within which the artwork is encountered. As a result of the variability of situation, the same physical object could be regarded in one circumstance as an artwork or, in a different circumstance, something that is not art. Consider the following example of status drift. Suppose there is a white concrete wall in a parking garage and it has a dark gray scuff mark on it. It is unlikely anyone would regard the scuff mark as a work, much less as a work of art. Instead, given its context, it will likely be assumed by everyone that a car accidentally came in contact with the retaining wall. But someone, call him Jack, has just returned from an exhibition at the Guggenheim Museum in New York in which a hundred scuff marks of just this kind were exhibited on white concrete walls. Jack will have a momentary thought that the scuff mark is at least *like* a work of art. For Jack, the status of the scuff exists in this quasi-artlike state until later in the week when he reads an article in *Art Forum* that the artist Kim Sullymann, who mounted the show he has just seen at the Guggenheim, has begun placing her scuff pieces in various public spaces—especially parking garages—in cities throughout the United States. Now the scuff mark, for Jack, begins to acquire the status of a full-fledged work of art. He infers that Sullymann has made a work and it is being offered for his active contemplation. Jack pays a different kind of attention to the mark each morning as he pulls into his parking space. Soon after, Jack comes upon a list of the cities

Ms. Sullymann has visited to place her scuff marks. His city is not on the list. Now, for Jack, the status of the scuff mark shifts back to being an accidental rubbing (although Jack is likely to begin to view all accidental rubbings in a more interested way, which may indeed have been Kim Sullyman's goal for her scuff works). The mark in the parking garage has undergone a strange kind of shift. Its status as art or not-art has drifted, migrating from being an accidental artifact of the process of parking a car, to a quasi work of art, to being a work of art, and back to being an accidental relic of an encounter between car and wall.

Art is migrant, a drifter. The concept is slippery because, as a semiotic event, works of art are highly dependent upon the situation in which the sign exchange occurs. This view is in keeping with, and indeed shines light upon, the way art is perceived in our society today, and it accounts for the disagreements that surround the issue of what art is. Nevertheless, that it manifests this instability is no argument that it is an entirely open or boundless concept—it is constrained by the contextual, environmental function of its semiotic exchange.

With this understanding of the term "artwork," we turn to the notion of the elite experience and the ability of some artworks to foster such experiences.

What Is Elite Aesthetic Experience?

The ways that we experience objects with respect to attentiveness can be ordered hierarchically.[12]

A. Pre-aesthetic Levels of Attention

1. Perceptive: immediately experienced and recognized as something ready to be interpreted.
2. Representative: recognized as something referring to something else.

B. Aesthetic Levels of Attention

3. Expressive: recognized as qualitatively, emotionally, and intellectually meaningful.
4. Supra-significant: singularly meaningful through integration of its parts.

The following elaboration on these will be brief, but we hope to provide enough clarification to help explain what is meant by the "elite experience."

1. *Perceptive*.[13] As a sign, a work of art must be a perceived thing or event. A sign being an entity that lies below the dualistic divide, there is no attempt in our account to determine whether the perceived thing is classified as either a material artifact or an imagined object. In its

character as perceived experience, it is acting solely as a target of attention, a thing noticed, sign qua sign.

2. *Representative*. The second level of attention includes interpretation, the sign in its role of surrogate, standing for something else. In the most ubiquitous cases of representative attention, the sign itself becomes quite "transparent." Such is the case of the words you are reading now, in which you attend to the glyphs of a font, but your awareness is of the reference of the language. The most direct cases are denotative, in which, as with the font, the sign is understood as something outside of its own embodiment. Most signs we encounter in everyday life are intended to be similarly employed to transparently move thought and action away from themselves, toward referents that are exterior to their own materiality. However, representative attention may also be more indirect. For example, someone you and a friend both know well, call him Harry, is known to be a profligate spender. You are telling your friend about someone you recently met named Martha, and you say, "Martha has the same tendency as Harry." Here, the idea is conveyed that Martha is a profligate spender, but this representation is made by association, or connotatively.

3. *Expressive form*. A work presents itself as expressive form when it entices discoveries within its own boundaries. This internal focus is, perhaps paradoxically, accompanied by and correlated with feelings and emotions as well as generalized, sometimes abstract, thoughts. However expansive in terms of feelings, and generative in terms of thoughts, expressivity is localized with respect to the artwork that has it; it is something unavailable elsewhere—neither before the advent of the work nor outside of it—but superveniently coupled to the work's embodiment. Expressive form is a bifurcation of the interpretant, so while it may have an "outward thrust" (reference to the world), attention on the expressive form is always intransitive, reflexively directed toward the work for its own sake. This level of attentive experience is an aesthetic level. It corresponds to that of Umberto Eco, Roman Jakobson, and others who place the aesthetic function of communication at the point where the feedback of attention onto the sign's materiality[14] and significatory devices interrupts the usual flow of extrinsic, nonreflexive, utilitarian communicative interactions.[15]

4. *Supra-significant integration: elite experience*. In some rare aesthetic experiences, something occurs that reaches beyond the normal reflexivity of expressive form such that it is appropriate to mark the experience as being elite. Elite experience, which carries with it a sense of transcendence, involves a remarkable flurry of referents, so bountiful that they seem to be extraordinarily replete,[16] while also carrying great

force in their connotative resonance (see figure 2).[17] These resonances are focused by and in the work, elicited through the formal characteristics of the work and its locus within a particular cultural context. It is almost as if the artwork acts upon the associative experience in the way a magnifying lens is able to concentrate light into an intense ignition beam. These bountiful associative connotations are a paradox because while they might be expected to steal attention away from the work by the nature of their extrinsic associations to referents outside the qualities and internal content of the work, they nevertheless are *felt* to be simultaneously within and of the work, inseparable from the work's very essence. In this way there is a simultaneous capturing of attention toward greater refinement of detail within the expressive form of the work, but also the releasing of reference outwardly toward the world. These two processes are nevertheless experienced as a single, integrated whole. In some ways, elite experience would seem to be merely an extension or intensification of aesthetic attention, were it not for the fact that the integration of the abundant connotations coupled with the power of expression lead to the qualitative aspects of the experience being perceived as something of a completely different



Figure 2. The Contexts of the Elite Aesthetic Experience.

> order. If aesthetic experience could be put in terms of topography, the expressive form is hill to elite experience's mountain: where the former may prove pleasant, the latter is always profound.

Elite experience further elaborated and described

It should first be remembered that, as a level of attention, the elite aesthetic experience subsumes, envelops, and includes the other three levels, so the elite experience is also experiencing a work that is a perceived representation that has expressive form.[18] In the case of a work that elicits elite experience, the richness and depth of resonance and the bounty of associative connotations is often so great that the work is frequently described as providing insight.[19]

The insight presented in an elite experience is a new or particularly apt sense of the human situation, or of one's transience, or the glorification of life—in short, what humanity and the world are in the deepest possible sense: an apprehension enacted by a merging of thought and feeling. As such, elite experience becomes a kind of transcendence. It is usually, although it need not inevitably be, accompanied by some sort of physiological signs: the hair may stand up on the back of one's neck, perhaps one feels a tingle down the spine, chills in the back of the head, palms may dampen, eyes moisten. The acknowledgment of an insight or a rising of the experience to some integrative super-signification beyond oneself and even beyond the artwork suggests that we have brought this account back to the idea that the sign, the artwork, is not only reflexively internal but also outwardly indexical—indeed, transcendently so—pointing us beyond itself/ourself.

Others have tried to characterize what we call elite experience. Abraham Maslow called these "peak experiences," Dewey termed them "consummatory," Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi called it "flow." Beyond the bodily signs, there are cognitive indications of the elite experience. There is a sense of oneness, of "a temporary loss of a sense of time, space, and self-awareness."[20] One becomes subsumed by and in the work.[21] There is a kind of interpenetration, so in the case of experiencing a work of art in this profound way, it often seems to become its own parallel world, so full-fledged and developed that it beckons our attention from any other, including our daily-life world.

We present two descriptions that attempt to describe elite experience. The first, by writer Francine Prose, works from the inside by painting a picture of the feelings she experienced on reading Chekhov on a regular train commute; the second works from the outside by describing the intricate features of a piece of music that engendered an elite experience for a listener.

> The stories were not only profound and beautiful, but also involving, so that I would finish one and find myself, miraculously, a half hour or so closer to home. And yet there was more than the distraction, the

> time so painlessly and pleasantly spent. A sense of comfort came over me, as if in those thirty minutes I myself had been taken up in a spaceship and shown the whole world, a world full of sorrows, both different and very much like my own, and also a world full of promise.[22]

> The music finds a way out of this dilemma, and it is a clever one. Following upon the "definitive" arrival on E . . . a reshaping of the earlier bass flourish . . . leads to a tag that guides us back to the original progression and to stability. This tag is not new: it is a reprise of the tag that began the song . . . An opposition is thus established between two competing tonal identities for the song: on one hand, the instrumental presentation of the 1–5 chord progression with its relatively stable 1–centeredness, and on the other, the dissolution of that progression in the sung verse, with its relatively unstable 5–centeredness. Significantly, this opposition is already contained, in embryo, within the [central] progression itself; and also within the tag, whose two formulas suggest a reverse progression: not–1 to 1.[23]

Whereas the formal elements of Chekhov's stories are not detailed, the effect they have on the reader is deep and clearly goes beyond the ordinary: "the whole world" opens to Ms. Prose. In the second passage, which incidentally is describing a work by a rock band, the emphasis is placed on the intricacies of structural detail so that the surprising relationships of opposing parts rivet the attention and wonderment of the listener. The former describes the elite experience produced by the work; the latter purports to describe the expressive form of the work in an attempt to understand how it succeeds in evoking elite experience.

Reestablishing verticality

In both cases we are shown the complexities and the focused attention that enable elite aesthetic experiences. In her account, Prose reflects on Chekhov on her daily commute; Boone speaks only of the form of the music. As it happens, these two expositions exemplify two categorically divergent paths in talking about artworks and their roles. Richard Shusterman has suggested that this divide between "life function" and form is precisely the divide between what is considered, respectively, low and high art.[24] Shusterman argues, evoking John Dewey, that life function should no more devalue popular forms than should formal aspects reify other art genres. He levels the arts according to their sociological contexts.

This issue bears directly on the central point we wish to make in this article. For while we agree with Shusterman's efforts to level the arts as sociologically driven genres, we wish to reconstruct verticality based on experiential content. It is our contention that, regardless of the social or personal circumstances that contextualize the art situation, it is yet possible to demarcate an experiential terrain that is in danger of being overlooked in accounts such as Shusterman's. This terrain is not flat; it is proper to speak of

aesthetic experiences in terms of their elevation, and doing so introduces a hierarchy. This experiential hierarchy is more than a matter of like/dislike or taste (although taste preferences no doubt affect the experience). Certain experiences are so valuable that they deserve to be reified. Works that provide this experience should be exalted; there should be a hierarchy among works of art. We do not see this hierarchy being genre-driven, but rather based upon the capacity for particular works of art to elicit the elite experience. We expect that for a given receiver, the condition for elite experience may be quite variable, requiring a kind of matching of context, artwork qualities, and particular life history of the recipient. Elite experience can no doubt be found for some by attending a classical concert, for others by contra dancing through the night, and for still others by listening to recordings of jazz in their living rooms in the evening. It is not the category, genre, or style of a work, but rather the experience of it that we wish to reify.

Comparisons with Similar Aesthetic Accounts

The discussion has proposed that the idea of being elite can, and ought to be, transferred from its sociological context to a category of experience, a reconceptualization that retains the sense of what is admirable and desirable but places it in the context of human experience. Crucial to this proposal has been an account of aesthetic experience and the ways something about it might be called elite. The characterization of aesthetic experience, and particularly its elite level, will undoubtedly put the reader in mind of similar themes raised by aestheticians in the past. On one hand, the proposal here is intended to extend or renew what others have said. We believe we have added something new in the distinction we make between two levels of aesthetic experience. But since common ground can be found between this account and a fair number of others, we should at least briefly indicate how our account differs from those of others—at least the others known to us. Following, then, are brief discussions of the views that seem to come closest to the one proposed here.

John Dewey

The emphasis we place on the experiencing of the artwork immediately puts one in mind of John Dewey. Like Dewey, we emphasize experience rather than the materiality of an art object. Indeed, we use a semiotic construction of experience that, while different from his matrix of doing/undergoing/perception, is, like his, decidedly triadic.[25] There is also, no doubt, a Deweyesque sensibility to our insistence upon the primacy of a particular kind of highly valued experience. Yet there are significant differences in our approaches. For Dewey, "to be artistic, a work must also be esthetic."[26] In our

view, it is possible for something to be seen as a work of art merely upon the inference that it is a product that is "offered" for contemplation, whether or not that contemplation does in fact result in an aesthetic experience. Furthermore, Dewey does not regard aesthetic experience as having two distinct levels; his seems to be most closely comparable to the elite kind.

Dewey sees the aesthetic as something that is "framed for enjoyed receptive perception,"[27] whereas we see no need to stipulate a purpose of enjoyment, only that the work be offered for an act of contemplation. This difference is more significant than it might seem at first blush: Dewey sees artworks as inherently evaluative, manifesting the aesthetic, which is always a positive attribute, whereas we insist on the neutrality of the term "work of art" rather than seeing it as evaluative. Also, Dewey's aesthetic experience is "inherently connected to the experience of making,"[28] while in our account the aesthetic is an independent level of attentive experience. In our argument the inference of a maker is implicated in the notion of a work (and therefore also in our conception of a work of art), but we demand neither that the work succeed in being aesthetic in order for it to attain the status of art, nor that the aesthetic be tied to making. To be precise, we do value artworks that evoke elite experience. However, the value derives from the artwork being an "instrument" toward a valued experience. Because of the immanence (opacity) of the instrument, which enhances them as signs, it takes on a value in itself that places it higher than other signs.

Another distinction is that whereas Dewey wishes to expand our ability to have consummatory experience in our lives, thus making the consummatory experience more common, we view elite experience as something that is always rare—necessarily so, as it stands in contradistinction to the mundane activities of life—and therefore we expect artworks capable of eliciting it to be equally rare. In this last distinction we are in some ways opposite Dewey, arguing for the impossibility, even the undesirability, of widespread elite experience.

Eliseo Vivas

Eliseo Vivas picks up Dewey's signature of the centrality of experience but provides a narrower exposition of what kinds of experiences are aesthetic.

> An esthetic experience is an experience of rapt attention which involves the intransitive apprehension of an object's immanent meanings in their full presentational immediacy.[29]

This concise definition of the aesthetic experience resonates in many respects with what we are proposing. The aesthetic experience's dependency upon "rapt attention," which we accept and find crucial to our view of the matter, is characterized by Vivas as having two qualities. The first is that the apprehension of the object's meanings is intransitive; the second is that the

object's meanings are characterized by their "immanence" in their "full presentational immediacy."

Intransitive attention, according to Vivas, is

> so controlled by the object that it does not fly away from it to meanings not present immanently in the object; or in other words that attention is so controlled that the object specifies concretely and immediately through reflexive cross-references its meanings and objective characters.[30]

What we find wanting in Vivas's account provided in the quotation is an acknowledgment of a second level, a level of transcendence, that is at once immanent yet bountifully connotative. We have thus proposed two grades of aesthetic experience. Requisite to both is that attention be held to the sign, or "rapt," as Vivas would have it. Whereas intransitive attention is constant in both kinds of aesthetic experience, we find "full presentational immediacy" to be characteristic of the split between the third experiential level of aesthetic and elite experience. While seemingly remaining immanent, denotatively centralized, so to speak, elite experience produces the powerful supra-signification of bountiful connotations that do indeed "fly away" to referents that are not simply immanent in the artwork. The final movement of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, the "Ode to Joy," has the capacity to inspire a sense of humanity's common plight, of transgressions to this notion, the struggle to find peace, a sense of brotherhood. These connotations spring partly from Schiller's text, but they go much farther than the immanence of the work. It is precisely this paradoxical quality of being within and without—the braiding of both into a unifying whole—that marks the elite experience. Here we suggest an advance beyond the concept of Vivas's rapt attention. In elite experience the artwork is denotatively immanent while being connotatively über-transitive, extrapolative, and holistic. In elite experience the meanings encountered are, in a sense, Janus-like—inseparable and simultaneously inward-facing and outward-facing. This is how it is possible for some aesthetic experiences to feel as if the artwork is about more than itself even while our attention is focused squarely upon it. There is a continuous relationship established, which resonates throughout the sign, between the references that are nonaesthetic and located outside the artwork and those reflexive aspects that transfix our attention within it. Each affects the other, but it is crucial to remember that what is transcendent in elite aesthetic experience is so only by means of and through its sign.

Umberto Eco

In *A Theory of Semiotics* Umberto Eco places aesthetic experience firmly within, and indeed, central to, semiotics. Key to Eco's aesthetics is the "ambiguous and self-focusing text."[31] As with Vivas, the focusing of attention is a critical component of the aesthetic experience. This attention takes place

over a period of time, which is extended in duration when compared to nonaesthetic communication. In Eco's account of aesthetic experience, ambiguity plays an important role. Ambiguity "focuses my attention and urges me to an interpretive effort."[32] This is an extension of the position held by Jakobson and the Russian formalists: ambiguity is the device that accounts for and enables the holding of attention. This has the effect of allowing progressively finer levels of semiotic detail to become revealed as successively salient: "not only can the sign-vehicle be detected as a pertinent element of the expression system; even the material consistency of the sign-vehicle becomes a field for further segmentation."[33]

While our view, especially in its semiotic foundation, is largely in harmony with Eco's, we do not stress the role of ambiguity. By our account, what is paramount is the manner in which a sign is interpreted, regardless of what may or may not be formally present in the sign as influencing factor. We are not prepared to stipulate such a narrow causation as the formalists' "priem otstranenie" (strangeness) nor a single interpretive attribute such as ambiguity.[34] Instead, we simply claim that the act of rapt and intransitive attention on a sign embodies the concept of aesthetic attentive experience. When a work of art, no matter its form, is found to call attention back onto itself, to hold the attention, to be beheld for its own sake, it is contemplated and is aesthetic. And when it further enables an integrated supra-signification, a bountiful fullness of associative connotations and feelings, it is aesthetic in the elite sense in that it is an aesthetic experience that is both rare and desirable.

George Dickie, Arthur Danto, artworld and "narrative" theories

On its surface, our account would seem to conflict completely with the "artworld" theories of aesthetics most prominently put forward by George Dickie,[35] and to also differ in essential ways from Arthur Danto's art-as-narrative concept, a common thread for him throughout the thirty years from 1964 to 1995.[36] Both of these accounts are attempts to include the openness and unbounded qualities of what come to be seen as artworks. As has been widely recounted, these strategies avoid the essentialism that is inherent in definitions that rely on necessary and sufficient conditions. By taking a view of the matter that is cultural or institutional, they have little to say about the experiencing of art, while the very heart of our appeal is to do the opposite: to return from the wider cultural perspective to the personal, to experience.

Nevertheless, the account we present here does contain important elements that artworld theories rightly emphasize: the recognition that being "offered for" is inherently a part of the reception of something as an artwork. Seen as narrative, the ability to see something as offered means that one is engaging in a kind of social discourse (even if implied). Offering may involve not only something the artist does but also those functions performed

by members of the artworld. In other words, although our view of art does not require an institution or well-marked narrative of any particular kind, it does recognize the important role such institutions and discussions play in the process of communications of all kinds, the art situation being a unique case in point. It is just that we want to allow so many other places to be sites for aesthetic and indeed elite art experiences as well. We also want to disengage our rendering of an artwork from any intention a maker may have and to put that determination on the receiving side of the communicative act. No doubt much of this communication takes place around the discourses and institutions that spring into being around the subject, just as sports pages in newspapers came into existence around their subject. But one should not mistake the newspaper account for the contest. Likewise, an account of art should go beyond a description of how the subject is culturally embedded; it should also provide a non-tautological prescriptive tool for understanding its subject. That is what we have tried to do here.

Binkley and indexing

Timothy Binkley, in arguing against aesthetic theories, introduces the notion of indexing, which is close to our concept of offering.[37] This is ironic, given that his purpose is to argue against an aesthetic account and ours is to restore and extend aesthetic principles. Binkley first argues that if there is an aesthetic, it cannot reside as qualities of the embodied object called an artwork. "Art is a practised discipline of thought and action, like mathematics, economics, philosophy, or history. The major difference between art and the others is that doing art is simply employing indexing conventions defined by the practice."[38] And, "to be an artist is to utilize artistic conventions to index a piece."[39] The circularity here is difficult to escape (Dickie claims it cannot and need not be escaped[40]) and fails in our view by the same critique we have provided above. But when Binkley says "to be an artist is not always to make something, but rather to engage in a cultural enterprise in which artistic pieces are *proferred for consideration*,"[41] (emphasis ours) he embraces a theme that we have argued is indeed essential: that the work be seen as being offered. For Binkley, at the point when the proffering takes place, the piece is already art (by virtue of the artist indexing it as such), while in our account the reception of a work as being offered is a necessary condition to its being art. Binkley requires that the piece be "considered." But what does considering a piece involve? We go further to say that it must be actively contemplated.

Agreeing with Binkley, we claim that the status of a work as artwork does not depend upon any particular aesthetic response (in terms of the work's success in eliciting such) but only inasmuch as it stands in a sort of candidacy for aesthetic experience, in that it is seen as something offered for that kind of consideration. But contra Binkley, we see the matter of aesthetics, as we have described the experience and applied broadly to include as

works such conceptual acts he describes, to be inherently implicated in the notion of art, even if deferred, even when a work of art fails to engage us aesthetically.

Cluster accounts

Berys Gaut and others have suggested that a Wittgensteinian "cluster concept" could be fundamentally important to understanding what an artwork is.[42] By this account, a list of features, A, B, C, D, E, and F are proposed as typical features of art. If something has all the features, it is definitely art. But it is not necessary that art possess the entire set A-F. If, say, an artifact has A, B, and C, that is also perhaps sufficient for it to be art. If an artifact has D, E and F, then it may also prove sufficient to be art (even though A-B-C and D-E-F have no features in common). In this way there is no determinate set of features that are both necessary and sufficient for art, but various combinations of features can tip the balance. The appeal of this strategy is obvious. It can account for the inclusion of Leonardo's "Mona Lisa" and Mondrian's "Broadway Boogie-Woogie," it allows conceptual art to be included as well as representational works, and it also absorbs the theories of art that are historically oriented.

The account we have laid out here is antithetical to a cluster account. Ours is not an amorphous and expandable cluster, but a focused definition, consisting of three necessary and sufficient conditions. We think that cluster accounts account for too much. If the elements listed in the cluster include only formal traits, it is already huge for all that. If the cluster is also asked to include various experiential qualities, then it quickly becomes so extensive and liberal in its admittance, it becomes functionally useless. As the list grows, the specificity declines. Increasingly flabby in their explanatory power, cluster accounts can describe social behavior *post facto* but cannot prescribe in a given instance.

We approach art as a kind of semiotic engagement, one that can be defined quite narrowly, although the kind of experience we delineate allows unbounded openness to the forms art takes.

James C. Anderson, Nick Zangwill, and aesthetic approaches

James C. Anderson, in his "Aesthetic Concepts of Art," speaks of two kinds of aesthetic approaches: descriptive and evaluative. In setting a threshold for what is considered to be a work of art, recall that ours is a descriptive approach.[43] Meanwhile, in describing the aesthetic experience and ultimately the elite experience, ours is an evaluative approach.

It is also important to distinguish our conception with one that Anderson calls the aesthetic intention strategy. By this view, an artist has an intention to make something with "the capacity to satisfy the aesthetic interest."[44] Anderson mentions that by this stricture, a handsaw could never be considered a work of art, because being made to simply saw wood efficiently, it was "not

guided by the specific aesthetic intention." In our view this determination is placed not at the front end by a hypothetical or surmised intention of the maker, but at the back end by what the receiver infers. So, were the handsaw in the right art situation—for instance, mounted on a gallery wall as an object to be contemplated in its own right—then it could be rightly called a work of art. This is so even if the handsaw maker were to vehemently protest that she was simply making a utilitarian carpentry instrument, nothing more. In our view the maker's intentions in fashioning an object go only so far as to render it "a work." Its qualification as a work of art depends upon an interpreter's inference that it has been offered for contemplation. This separation, we believe, is crucial in distinguishing our conception of art from the many others, including its fellow aesthetic stratagems.

Then this makes our theory sound very much like what Anderson calls the "aesthetic function" strategy. In Anderson's rendering of it, the aesthetic-functionalist view is that "something is a work of art if it is an artifact and functions to provide aesthetic appreciation." But again there are significant differences between our view and this strict aesthetic-functionalist account. In our account a work does not have to successfully *function* in providing aesthetic appreciation; it only has to be "offered" for some such purpose. We also reject the term "appreciation"; the work could well fail to provide appreciation of any kind, aesthetic or otherwise. We prefer the neutral concept of active contemplation rather than aesthetic appreciation or aesthetic pleasure (i.e., Jerrold Levinson) or other such evaluative terms. The status of an artwork qua artwork is simply the fact of being a work that is interpreted as being offered for contemplation. Whether or not it succeeds, brings pleasure, or manages to produce the rare and desired elite experience, it will be seen as an artwork via a completely descriptive, rather than evaluative, standard.

Zangwill proposes, "Something is a work of art because and only because someone had an insight that certain aesthetic properties would depend on certain nonaesthetic properties; and because of this, the thing was intentionally endowed with some of those aesthetic properties in virtue of the nonaesthetic properties, as envisaged in the insight."[45] Like many others, Zangwill placed the artist's intentions at the forefront of the determination of the status of artwork. We have just refuted this view, but it is interesting to test the incorporation of Zangwill's specification as a mechanism by which something comes to be offered. If one were to understand his use of the term "aesthetic properties" to mean the notion of intransitive and reflexive attention, something like Zangwill's explanation could be seen as the underlying assumption that is made when one infers that a work is offered for active contemplation. While Zangwill seems to be attaching this insight to the maker of an artifact, our account leaves open the possibility that the maker of an artifact never had such an intuition.

Conclusion: Toward a New Elitism

The "artist" has been largely absent in our account for a reason. We do not dispute that in seeing a work as being offered for aesthetic experience, there is the implicit or tacit understanding that someone has done the insightful work of, to quote Zangwill above, "intentionally endowing" something, whether the endowment amounts to pointing to it (Binkley's indexing), forming the artifact with features that cue it (Zangwill), or sharing the experience of it within a culturally defined set of practices (Dickie and Danto). These are each, in their way, mechanisms by which something may come to be inferred as offered for contemplation. The mechanism really has to do with the question, what is an artist? But that is not the question we have tried to answer. Our dual questions have been (1) what is an artwork? and (2) what can be said of the levels of aesthetic experience artworks promise? All that can be said definitively in answer to the first of these questions is that sometimes a work is perceived as being offered for a particular kind of experience, an experience that involves a kind of attention that in its intransitive and reflexive character is distinct from all others, and that is called the aesthetic experience. What can be said of the second question is that, on rare and often memorable occasions, the aesthetic experience achieves a remarkable salience, becomes what we have called an elite experience, one that moves us to a union of intellect and emotion, to feel as if we have attained, through the experiencing of the artwork, a deep insight into our life-world.

In addition to the role of the artist, the position we have outlined here raises many other questions and lines of investigation that are beyond the scope of this essay to answer. Why does a given work elicit the elite experience in one person but not a neighbor? Is it possible that the process of developing an appreciation for one kind of artwork could inhibit the ability to appreciate a different kind? Are there qualities that tend to be found across genres that nevertheless are common in the fostering of elite experience? As a method of studying elite experience as it applies to art, do the new brain and neural mapping technologies offer the possibility of empirical data gathering? Each of these questions is worthy of continued study, and we believe the conceptual framework we have provided here can be used in these studies.

Finally, we admit to being perversely provocative in our co-opting of the word "elite." Our intent, of course, is to turn this term on its head so that instead of standing for a social class that is often perceived as snobbish, provincial, marginalizing, and socially disintegrative, we instead embrace a variety of aesthetic experience that is egalitarian, catholic, inclusive, and wholesome in its social practice. Instead of asserting that the elite experience is privileged for persons with a certain formal education, pedigree, or

position in society, we argue that elite experience is available to everyone and potentially could be triggered by diverse kinds of artworks. While provocative, our use of the term "elite" is not otherwise ironic. Elite experience is profound, transcendent, and deeply insightful. If elite experience is akin to that peak experience described by Maslow, it is an experience that has always been regarded, in every culture, as something both rare and valuable, something worth striving to acquire. In that respect, we should all aspire to be elitists.

NOTES

1. Charles Sanders Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931–1958). Following the convention of citing this work by volume and paragraph number: CP 2.228.
2. We include the word "active" simply to preclude a possible connotation of "contemplation" as something passive, sedate, and undemanding.
3. In the context of music, if not other art forms, the experience may be said to require what is called intradiction. Intradiction is an activity of predicting by means of a loosely relational anticipation of what is appropriately coming next. In some, if not many, musical compositions, the anticipation may be thwarted by innovations on the part of creative composers. But once such compositions have been heard, the introduction of surprises may be rejected as inappropriate, questionable, or perhaps instead just what was needed, or exactly right. However, the essential point is that an anticipatory response is internal to the artwork. Similar responses occur in other art forms—for example, in judging a texture in a painting to be effective in enhancing the color of the picture plane, or the recognition that a surprising interpersonal emotion attributed to a character in a story is just right for what had been described as important traits possessed by that character. See Hausman, "Insight in the Arts," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 45, no. 2 (1986): 163–74.
4. It will undoubtedly be pointed out by some readers that George Dickie rejected the view that there is an aesthetic attitude that is supposed to be special to aesthetic appreciation. Dickie claimed there is nothing special about experiences of paying close attention to something without attending to some external relation it might have. What we are describing so far may sound very much like an aesthetic attitude. We would like to make two points in this respect. First, we do not presuppose an attitude that must be present as a precondition to aesthetic experience. We are rather describing the kind of perception that happens *in and of* aesthetic experience; indeed, this kind of perception is that which is called aesthetic. It is not an attitude, but rather a way of receiving. Second, Dickie's criticism overlooks the semiotic structure of experience—in particular, the sign/referent connection. In an aesthetic experience the reflexive attention involved is characterized by a repetitive exchange between sign and referent such that the "materiality" of the sign as syntactic object—its inner relations of qualities: lines, textures, shapes, contrasts, etc.—are the foci for attention; while in its reference to semantic objects, there is great interest in how this material makes that connection. This creates the feedback loop of reflexivity that is indeed characteristic of the aesthetic experience, and it is our reason for adding the word "active."
5. Pointing to the saliency of the reflexivity of a work of art does not mean an artwork cannot also refer beyond itself. Indeed, the associative relations of a work of art will be taken up soon as an important feature in elite experience. We only wish, for now, to make the point that a distinguishing feature in

contemplation is the notion of reflexivity. Thus, a representational painting in part refers to things external to the painting. But the qualities of these things as displayed are not wholly independent of the qualities possessed by the thing before its representation appeared in the artwork. There is interdependence and interaction between the external subject and the object as represented.

6. It is possible that the failure to see the art exchange as an exchange—not of objects, not of direct experience, not solely of ideas, not of strictly sociological function, but rather a semiotic exchange of a particular sort—is at the root of much of the confusion that has surrounded the field of aesthetic inquiry.
7. Carl R. Hausman, *Metaphor and Art: Interactionism and Reference in the Verbal and Nonverbal Arts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 125.
8. Hausman, *Metaphor and Art*.
9. The diagram is a modification of one originated by Eliseo Vivas.
10. Hausman, *Metaphor and Art*.
11. Ibid.
12. The following discussion develops and extends some of the ideas put forward by Hausman (*Metaphor and Art,* 126 and following). The levels of attention are related to one another in an order of dependency such that lower levels are necessary conditions and inclusively enveloped within the higher levels. There are four levels of attention that are worth noting for our purposes. One could perhaps slice this into finer slices, but only these four are required to make the distinctions necessary in determining elite experience.
13. This is level of attention is essentially equivalent to Peirce's Sinsign.
14. On materially, see especially the discussion in Umberto Eco's *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 263–75.
15. Timothy Binkley explicitly denies the existence of expressive form as a necessary component of art, citing various conceptual artworks as evidence of his point. "Contra Aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 35, no. 3 (1977): 266–77. We will comment on Binkley later in this paper, but for now it is worth bearing in mind that our notion of expressivity has to do with the form of the sign, not necessarily any qualitative features of a physical artifact. Taken in this larger semiotic context, conceptual artworks would include more than the physical aspects of the tokens employed.
16. Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1976).
17. Cf. Max Black, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).
18. We remind the reader that our use of the word "representation" in this context is not the same as an artist's use of the term in calling a work "representational" (i.e., figurative).
19. Such works are frequently referred to as "masterpieces."
20. Abraham Maslow, *Religions, Values, and Peak-Experiences* (1964; Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1976). See also Lawrence J. Dennis and J. Francis Powers, "Dewey, Maslow, and Consummatory Experience," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 8, no. 4 (1974): 51–63.
21. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention* (New York: HarperCollins, 1996).
22. Francine Prose, *Reading Like a Writer* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 234.
23. Graeme M. Boone, "Tonal and Expressive Ambiguity in Dark Star," in *Understanding Rock : Essays in Musical Analysis,* ed. John Covach and Graeme M. Boone (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
24. Richard Shusterman, "Form and Funk," in *Aesthetics: A Reader in the Philosophy of the Arts,* ed. David Goldblatt and Lee Brown (1996; New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2004). See also Shusterman's "The Aesthetic Challenge of Popular Art," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 31, no. 3 (1991).
25. In admitting the similarity of the triadic structure, we do not want to suggest that we agree with Dewey's terminology here. Dewey did not credit Peirce when he adopted a Peircean triad for his model. John Dewey, *Art As Experience*

(London: Penguin Books, 1934). We would prefer to return to the more abstract Peircean structure of sign/referent/interpretant rather than Dewey's problematic psychologist/behaviorist framework.
26. Dewey, *Art As Experience*, 49.
27. Ibid., 49.
28. Ibid., 50.
29. Eliseo Vivas, *Journal of Philosophy* 34, no. 23(1937): 628–34.
30. Ibid., 631.
31. Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 262.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., 266.
34. Eco cites, in this respect, *priem ostrannenja*, the "device of making strange" of the Russian formalists. *Theory of Semiotics*, 264.
35. George Dickie, "The Institutional Theory of Art," in *Theories of Art Today*, ed. Noël Carroll (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 101.
36. Most vividly put forth in Danto's essay "The Artworld," *Journal of Philosophy* 61 (1964): 571–84.
37. Binkley, "Contra Aesthetics," 266–77.
38. Ibid., 274.
39. Ibid.
40. Dickie, "Institutional Theory of Art," 93–108. This was the final of Dickie's attempts to elaborate his aesthetic theory.
41. Binkley, "Contra Aesthetics," 274.
42. Berys Gaut, "Art as a Cluster Concept," in Carroll, *Theories of Art Today*, 25–44.
43. James C. Anderson, "Aesthetic Concepts of Art," in Carroll, *Theories of Art Today*, 65–92.
44. Monroe C. Beardsley, "An Aesthetic Definition of Art," in *What Is Art?* ed. Hugh Curtler (New York: Haven, 1983), 21.
45. Nick Zangwill, *Aesthetic Creation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 36.